



工業技術研究院

Industrial Technology
Research Institute

A Whitelisting Approach to Zero-Trust Cyber Defense

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Lessons from Recent Incidents

- **TSMC security breach**

1. Software installation USB carries malware (WannaCry)
2. Connected new computer to internal network without AV scan
3. Malware propagated around the network without barriers

- **總統府被駭**

1. Staff computer was compromised when connected to Internet
2. Compromised computer brought into intranet to access email server

- **中油網路系統遭到駭客攻擊**

1. AD server compromised and job scheduling policy tampered
2. All hosts under compromised AD server run distributed malware

- Ransomware attacks against 台塑化、力成、盟立, Garmin, etc.


- Lessons: (1) **Vulnerability exploitation** (2) **BYOD** (3) **Lateral propagation**




How to Exploit a Vulnerability

Attacker's objective: **get a program into the victim's computer**

Example: **Drive-by download**, in which an email containing a link, which points to a page whose content exploits a vulnerability of a browser




How to Stop a Vulnerability-Exploiting Attack



Many AI-based or anomaly
detection-based cyber security
solutions are here → **Security**
Information and Event Management (SIEM)

How to Stop a Vulnerability-Exploiting Attack



NCCIC's Seven Strategies for Defending Industrial Control Systems

SecurityST addresses
ALL 7 STRATEGIES

Percentages represent the number of ICS-CERT reported incidents in 2014 and 2015 that would have been prevented using that strategy.

38%

APPLICATION WHITELISTING

29%

**PROPER CONFIGURATION/
PATCH MANAGEMENT**

17%

REDUCE YOUR ATTACK SURFACE

9%

BUILD A DEFENDABLE ENVIRONMENT

4%

MANAGE AUTHENTICATION


2%

MONITOR AND RESPOND

1%

SECURE REMOTE ACCESS

As-Is Security Posture:
Large Attack Surface



■ High Risk: Large Attack Surface
■ Low Risk: Small Attack Surface

Objective Security Posture:
Small Attack Surface



7

NUMBER OF STRATEGIES
recommend by ICS-CERT to
mitigate top cyber threats.

243

AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS
before detection that a system is
compromised.

10/12

**THE NUMBER OF SOFTWARE PATCHES
TESTED MONTHLY**
in the BHGE Validation Lab that require modifications
to ensure no negative effect on operations.

26%

OF INCIDENTS
investigated by ICS-CERT were spear phishing,
making it the leading threat for 2016.

74%

OF EXPLOITS
are targeted at applications, with more
than 40% of those being Microsoft & Adobe.

98%

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
ICS-CERT responded to in FY2014 and FY2015 that
would have been prevented using the Seven Strategies.




The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) is the Nation's flagship cyber defense, incident response, and operational integration center. Our mission is to reduce the Nation's risk of systemic cybersecurity and communications challenges.

Windows-based AWL



- AWL check for **binary code**, **shared library** and **kernel module**, as well as scripts written in interpretive languages, e.g., **Power shell**, **command shell**, **python**, **Java**, etc.
- System administration flexibility: **physically enabled scoped** turn-off of AWL check to enable interactive system maintenance & false positive resolution
- Main Technical Challenges:
 - Automated creation of the initial application whitelist, e.g., a Windows 2020 server
 - Automated and accurate AWL update upon application Installation or update (AIU)
 - **Manually re-scan a given Windows machine**
 - **Manually initiate an AIU transaction against a set of machines**
 - **A Windows Update server initiates an AIU transaction against a set of client machines**
 - **An AD server initiates an AIU transaction against a set of AD client machines**
 - **When an application whitelisted on a Windows machine self-updates itself, e.g., Chrome**


What If Allowed Programs Have Vulnerabilities?




Program Semantics-Aware Intrusion Detection

Objective: A program is only allowed to make system calls at run time in a way specified by its code: which calls, where and in what order

Compile Time




Run Time



Control Flow Integrity Assurance

- **Objective:** A program's execution follows its control flow graph
- Why?
 - Code injection attack is getting harder
 - Code reuse attack is on the rise
 - Return to libc
 - Return-oriented programming (ROP)
- Enforcement of control flow integrity
 - **Compile time:** compute the control flow graph and targets of indirect jumps/calls
 - **Run time:** check the actual targets of indirect jumps/calls are the same as those computed at compile time
- Used in Android kernel/framework




Multi-Tier Whitelisting as Unified Host Defense

- **Key idea:** Extract the allowed run-time behaviors from programs installed on a **fixed-functionality device**, and check the run-time execution of these programs against the allowed behaviors to detect any deviations/attacks
 - **Characterize the good rather than profile the bad**
 - **Fixed-functionality devices** include IoT device/gateway, ATM, SWIFT server, PLC controller, machining tool, WiFi router, smart lamp post, smart meter, smart speaker, home gateway, **drone**, **autonomous driving vehicle**, etc.
- Multiple tiers of whitelist check on a program's run-time behavior
 - Tier 1:** A program's **binary code** as a whole
 - Tier 2:** The set of **system resources accessed** by a program
 - Tier 3:** The **system calls** that a program makes
 - Tier 4:** The **control transfer flow** during a program's execution

How to Whitelist a Fixed-Functionality Device?

P1
P2
P3
....
P16
P17



P1
P2
P3
....
P16
P17



P1'
P2'
P3'
....
P16'
P17'

Application
Whitelist

System
Call
Pattern

Application
Whitelist

System
Call
Pattern

Control
Flow
Graph


Beyond Individual Hosts

Applying Whitelisting to Enterprise Security

- **Level 1:** Which **programs** are allowed to run on a server
- **Level 2:** Which **system resources** on a server are accessible to each allowed program on that server
- **Level 3:** Which **client computers** and **other servers** are allowed to interact with programs running on a server
- **Level 4:** Which **programs on allowed clients/servers** are permitted to interact with programs running on a server

Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)

- Devices brought into an enterprise by official employees and unofficial contractors
 - Laptop, smartphone, USB flash drive
- Malware on these devices could bypass peripheral defense to compromise the enterprise network
- Defense strategy: Enforce the invariant that **on BYOD devices, only pre-defined programs, e.g. virtual smartphone client, could interact with services on the enterprise network**



APP Streaming/VMI


- Use model: every enterprise employee is given a **virtual smartphone** in the cloud to do office work
 - An enterprise employee's or contractor's smartphone/laptop is able to interact with the enterprise's IT services through **exactly one program**: the AP/VMI client.



- Vision: **One APP for all (Android) APPs**
 - APPs run in the cloud, experience all sensors in a user's smartphone, and stream their outputs to the smartphone's audio/video devices.
 - No enterprise data could be downloaded to employee smartphones.
 - Enterprise smartphones/laptops now could be managed: data leakage prevention for LINE


App-Level Firewalling: Micro-Segmentation

- Objective: Limit the scope of **lateral propagation** of a malware attack when it compromises an enterprise net node
 - Flat → VLAN → Application-aware network segment
- **Communications Whitelisting**: Restrict the allowed communications among virtual machines or containers according to application-level communications patterns
 - 192.168.1.10:7891 --- 192.168.2.3:80
 - Chrome: xxxx --- Apache:80
- Challenge: How to distinguish between attacks and firewall rule violations due to exceptions or dynamic environments?



Whitelisting as Unified Cyber Defense Strategy

- Carefully design (green field) or characterize (legacy) allowed system behaviors
 - Which software programs
 - What resources they could access
 - Which programs could communicate with which



Summary

- Whitelisting is a generalization of secure boot to every aspect of a computer system's run-time behavior
 - BIOS
 - OS
 - Application's static image
 - Application's dynamic behavior
 - Communicating parties over the network
 - Programs used by communicating parties
- **Unified zero-trust design principle:** Only those that are explicitly allowed could proceed at run time
 - Pro: Zero false negative and no need to worry about new attacks
 - Con: How to ensure zero false positive in the presence of incomplete security policy rules and system changes



Thank You!

Questions and Comments?

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